The following comments reflect proposed changes in the MID 2.1 dataset based on reading of historical material. They are listed in random order.

1. Dispute #370, "Belgian Independence," 1830. This is the Belgian independence dispute. Actors listed in this dispute are Prussia, Russia vs. France, with Prussia displaying force by moving troops, Russia and France, threatening to intervene each on a different side of the dispute. However, the key actor in the dispute, the Netherlands, does not show up in the dispute. Here is some evidence about its participation.

Between the Congress of Vienna and the revolution in France on July 27-29 1830, Franco-Prussian relations were reasonably peaceful. However, the replacement of Charles X, the ultra-conservative king, by Louis Phillipe by a popular movement of liberal reformists, ignited nationalist and liberal sentiments in neighboring Belgium. On August 25, a popular uprising took place in Brussels, with liberal nationalists setting up barricades in the City and demanding secession of Belgium from the Netherlands. This confronted the major powers with a major problem given their commitment to preserve the old monarchic order in Europe.

However, the new liberal regime in France—and to a lesser extent Great Britain—developed a strong commitment to the Belgian demand. As Albrecht-Carrie (1958: 33) notes, “The Dutch ruler...appealed to his legitimate brother rulers—all, that is, but the French—for assistance in putting down the rebellion. Tsar Nicholas was most responsive: ... he was prepared to send troops; the Prussian King was not unfavorable, but both he and the tsar eventually insisted that action must be collective.” The new king in France was confronted by strong interventionist sentiments at home in support of the Belgian claim of independence. Accordingly, the Prussian army entered a state of alert, in preparation for a possibly collective intervention. From a Prussian perspective, the Belgian revolution created a new status quo that rendered Prussia highly dissatisfied with the course of affairs, partly due to fear of a spillover effect of a revolutionary liberal process that started in France and already threatened the unity of the Netherlands. Moreover, a Plea by the Dutch King to Prussia hinted to the possibility that the new state might become a de facto protectorate of France. Given the support of the tsar for a Prusso-Russian intervention, the Prussian King felt that they had the capability to deter the French and help restore the Dutch hold over Belgium, possibly also reversing the course of events in revolutionary France (Treitschke [1915], 1968: 48). There was also a possibility that, at the very least, France would be deterred from aiding the Belgians.

\[1\] Second edition of this document, includes changes and additions for the dyadic MID dataset, version 1.1 DYADMID1.1, January 22, 2001.
Faced by a threat of intervention, and an alert in the Prussian and Russian armed forces, Louis Phillipe expressed resistance to the idea of French intervention in support of the Belgians, but made it clear that “France would not tolerate the intervention of others.” The British, concerned that the European concert system would collapse if escalation took place, quickly positioned themselves as mediators, calling for a conference in London. By November 4, 1830, the London Conference, with participation of all major powers and the indigenous parties, recognized the new Belgian State.

From the Dutch perspective, the Brussels uprising clearly represented a major threat to the integrity of the Dutch monarchy. The risk was beyond the mere secession of Belgium from Holland; it was a potential takeover of Belgium by France, a prospect that appeared quite threatening, especially in light of the Dutch memory of Napoleon’s rule less than two decades ago. The plea of King William to the tsar of Russia and to Frederick William of Prussia emphasized this point (Treitschke [1915] 1968: 48). His reaction to the rebellion in Brussels was, as noted, to send his two sons with a small armed force in the hope of quelling the rebellion and to mobilize his army to prevent French intervention. The hope—fueled by Tsar Nicholas’s pledge—was that Prussia and Russia would send troops to the region as a counterforce or deterrent against France. Given this estimate, we can see the Dutch preference as characterized by dissatisfaction—given the Belgian rebellion—and a perception of capability—given the promise of Prusso-Russian intervention. However, once it became evident that Holland’s allies were not about to make good on their promises, the perception of Holland’s capabilities shifted dramatically.

Thus, it seems to me that we have here a militarized dispute starting on August 28, 1830, initiated by Holland against France (these are the first initiator and the primary target, respectively), and involving the Dutch show of troops, coupled with a Prussian alert and Russian threat to use force directed at France. French response to these actions was a threat to use force. There is no evidence of British military response. The British reaction was strictly diplomatic amounting to an initiative to convene a summit to resolve the crisis and proposing the London Protocol, which served as the basis for the legitimization of Belgian independence. Sources for this crisis include Treitschke ([1915] 1968), Albrecht-Carrie (1958), (Thomson, 1962).

The end date of the dispute is actually the signature of the London Treaty on January 12, 1831.

Thus, it seems to me that the outcome of the dispute is again not coded correctly. France, Prussia, and Russia all accepted the London Treaty, which established the Independence of Belgium. Thus the outcome of the dispute is a diplomatic victory for France, the stated objectives of which had been to prevent intervention by Germany and Russia on Netherlands’s side. Accordingly, the settlement is coded as a negotiated settlement for the France-Prussia and France-Russia dyads and as a “No Settlement” for the Netherlands-France dyad.

2. Dispute #25, Netherlands-Belgium, 1831. This is one of the most confusing disputes in the MID2.10 dataset, because in this dispute we seemingly have France and the UK on both sides of the dispute. I have done some research on this dispute. It turns out that: (1) The UK was only on France’s side, it actually showed force against Netherlands. Otherwise, its activity was strictly diplomatic. (2) France was
only on the target’s side, sending its troops into Belgium to thwart the Dutch attempt to overthrow the new Belgian regime, and (3) Prussia did issue an explicit threat to use force. Thus, this dispute is composed of the following dyads: Netherlands-Belgium, Netherlands-France, France-Prussia. Here is the documentation. (Source, Maoz and Mor, 1999).

“In July of 1831, a new crisis flared up in Belgium. This time the pretext was finding a candidate to step up to the Belgian throne. Some Belgians, intent on unification with France, offered that one of Louis Phillipe’s sons be appointed. The French objected and worked together with London to find a candidate who would preserve Belgian independence but—at the same time—would be opposed to Prussia’s efforts to dominate the new state. On July 21, the selected candidate, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, entered Belgium as Leopold I, the new king. However, on August 1, 1831, King William of the Netherlands announced that the truce agreed upon at the London conference came to an end. He dispatched an army to Belgium, which made major strides in the field, almost forcing King Leopold to flee Belgium. Leopold quickly appealed to the French and British. The former quickly dispatched an army into Belgium with the consent of the latter, in order to enforce the London agreement. Once this army entered Belgium, the Dutch army hastily retreated. On November 15, 1831, the London conference was reconvened to re-enforce the Twenty-Four Article Treaty to which the Dutch objected. As for Prussia, during this military process the entire Prussian court supported the Dutch invasion of Belgium. However,

French intervention was grudgingly endured [by Prussia.], since it was effected with surprising suddenness and could not be prevented in good time... As soon as the truce had been re-established, at the London conference King Frederick William [of Prussia] demanded, in set terms, the immediate withdrawal of the French, threatening that in case of need his Rhenish regiments would cross the frontier. Since all the powers supported Prussia’s demands, France was on this occasion compelled to keep troth (Treitschke [1915], 1968: 92-93).

The Prussian threat was, of course, an empty one. France hardly paid attention to it. It was more concerned about British reaction. The British actually mobilized some troops in Dover in preparation to help the French if needed, but once the French army accomplished its objective, the British insisted, just like the other major powers, on the immediate withdrawal of French troops.”

With respect to the Dutch-French Crisis,

“This crisis emerged out of Dutch defiance of the London agreement, which emerged from a conference wherein Holland was not represented and its interests—as it saw—were compromised by the other powers. Again, King William acted on the basis of an incorrect impression that he would get support from Prussia and Russia, thus sending troops to Belgium. Again, in this case, his preference structure was characterized by fundamental dissatisfaction with the independence of Belgium and a perception of capability—certainly with respect to Belgium, but possibly with respect to France, which he thought would be deterred from action by the other powers. This, of course, proved wrong, as the French (with a preference structure characterized by dissatisfaction and perception of capability) sent their troops to enforce the London agreement.
The lack of outside support forced William to pull back his troops following a first engagement with the French forces, and again accept (de facto) the status quo of an independent Belgian state, at least for the time being.”

3. Disputes #1039 and #3241 Black September, 1970. Both disputes are related to the “Black September” crisis and civil war in Jordan in September 1970. The first involves the Syrian intervention in the Jordanian civil war by sending its troops into Syria—with a major battle between the Jordanian and Syrian armed forces in Zerka, on September 22. The second involves the Soviet movement of its fleet to the Mediterranean in response to the US (and possibly British) alert and threat to intervene in the Jordanian-Syrian conflict.

There are four problems with these two disputes. First, they are not separate disputes but a single multilateral dispute. Second, in dispute #1039, a key actor—Israel—is missing. Third, in dispute #3241 Syria and Iraq are listed as participants on side B. This makes for a potential set of disputes between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Iraq and Syria, on the other. This is nonsense. Fourth, Libya—listed in the first dispute—was not involved in the dispute, the threat issued by Gaddafi should not be coded as a serious threat. There is no indication of a real intent to carry it out.


First, there is one dispute only. The two disputes should be merged into dispute #1039. On side A of the dispute we have Syria (high MCA: Clash=18, High Hostility: use force=4; fatality level=2); Iraq (high MCA: Alert=10, High Hostility: display force=3); and the Soviet Union (high MCA: show of ships = 8, High Hostility: display force=3); On side B of the dispute we have Jordan (high MCA: Clash=18, High Hostility: use force =4, fatality level=3); Israel (high MCA: Mobilization=12, High Hostility: display force=3); USA, (high MCA: Alert=10 [also show of ships], High Hostility: display force=3); UKG (same as USA).

Second, the dates of the dispute are: Jordan: 11 June-26 September 1970; Israel, 9-26 September; USA & UKG, 16-26 September; Iraq 16-26 September 1970, Syria: 11 June-26 September; Soviet Union, 18-26 September.

Third, outcomes are victory for Jordan Israel, defeat for Syria and Iraq, and no outcome for USA, UK and USSR. Settlement between Jordan-Syria, Jordan-Iraq is negotiated (Cairo Agreement of Sept. 26). None for all other dyads.

Sources for this crisis, in addition to the ones named above, include: For Jordan: Astorino-Courtois (1999); Lunt (1989: 131-150); for Syria (Seale, 1988; M. Maoz, 1995); for Israel (Rabin, 1979; Dayan, 1976); for the US Dowty (1984), Kissinger (1979); for the Soviet Union (Golan, 1990).2

2 For the full bibliographical details of the above sources see, Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor. International Hate Affairs: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries. Manuscript. Tel-Aviv, Tel Aviv University, 1999.
4. Lebanon, Syria, Israel in 1977-1985. Here we have a real set of problems. These are discussed at length below.

5. States switching sides during wars. The key problem is in WWII. France, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Finland switched sides in the war. For that reason, I decided to split the disputes of those states who switched sides. Thus, the dispute between the UK, France and the USSR in 1939 (following the latter’s invasion of Poland) is a separate dispute from WWII. The USSR is on the same side as UK in WWII. France is listed on one side of the war prior to its occupation by Germany and following its liberation in 1944. During the July 1940-July 1944 period, its disputes with UK, US, and others are listed separately. Finland’s part in the war is its participation on the Axis side between 1941 and 1944. After it decided to switch sides, its declaration of war on the Axis powers is listed separately. The same principle applies to Italy, Romania and Bulgaria. Finally, I decided to separate the intervention of the USSR against Japan following the Potsdam Conference and the Hiroshima bombing from its non-war dispute with Japan during WWII. The Soviet Declaration of War on August 8, 1945 and its attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria the same day is a step up from the non-violent actions that characterized their interaction from 1941 to 1945 (Weinberg, 1994: 889). And this is a declaration of war. In November 1941, while the Japanese were finalizing their plan to attack the US, they decided that they would decline any invitation by Germany and Italy to join the war against the USSR (Weinberg, 1994: 256-257). During the four years, both states held considerable forces along their common border, especially Manchuria, lest the other decides to attack, but there is no evidence of actual use of military force. Thus in dispute #258 we have the initiation of a MID by Japan against the USSR starting on Dec. 7, 1941 and ending on Aug. 7, 1945, High action is 12 (mobilization) at level 3 (Display of Force). Dispute #627 has the USSR declaring war (high act 20 at level 4) on Japan with the dispute ending three days later (Aug. 10, 1945).

Here are responses to some comments by colleagues.

A. Scott Bennet’s Comments:

1. Newspaper reports on Feb 14 (?) 1987 suggest fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia that is not recorded as a MID.

Keesings1987, (vol. XXXIII, p.35043) reports that on Feb. 12, 1987 Ethiopian troops launched an air and ground attack on Somali positions. The attack took place on six settlements in north-west Somali, some 20 km. from the border. However, the Somali opposition party SNM also claimed it was responsible for the attacks. According to the testimony of a captured Ethiopian tank division officer, Ethiopian forces has operated jointly with rebels of the SNM, who cooperated in acting as guides and interpreters during the attack. The Ethiopian government announced on Feb 17 that an official inquiry would be held to determine the cause of the incident, while expressing the wish that it would not prejudice the peace process.

It is not clear whether this attack was government sanctioned on part of Ethiopia. At any rate, there is no evidence of overt Ethiopian government involvement. Admittedly a borderline case, but here we are inclined to go with the original coding.

2. Langer (1972) reports that the British and French occupied Peking in 1860 to punish the Chinese for various actions. This is not coded as a MID.
The Oct. 12, 1860 occupation of Peking by Britain and France is not included in the MID data set because China meets the criteria of membership in the interstate system only following the 1857-1860 Second Opium War (which ended with the occupation of Peking), when Britain and France acquire the right to send permanent diplomatic missions to Peking.

Criteria qualifying a political entity as a member of the interstate system (during the years 1816-1919) are defined by Small and Singer as follows: “Once both of these powers (France and Britain) had established diplomatic missions at or above the rank of charge d’affairs in the capital of any nation with the requisite half million population, that nation was classed as a member of the interstate system.” (Small and Singer, 1982: pp. 40-41).

In the case of China, it is only after the occupation of Peking by Britain and France in Oct. 1860, that a peace treaty was reached securing the rights for Britain and France to station diplomatic missions in China. Therefore, only MIDs involving China that occur after Oct. 1860 are included in the data set.

3. Lebanon – Israel – Israel attacked Lebanon in 1978, and invaded in 1982. Why aren’t these MID’s?

Israel’s 1978 conflict with Lebanon should be included in the data set and is presently being coded. As for the 1982 invasion, the actual invasion followed a series of border incidents which began in 1980. The dispute should include a Lebanon-Israel dyad and a Syria-Israel dyad. Disp. #3444 in fact refers to this dispute and is coded as a dispute between Israel and Syria which started Aug. 24, 1980 and ended Sept. 1, 1982 (and includes the war). However, Lebanon was missing from the data set and is being added.

This issue is tricky because it is unclear whether Lebanon enjoyed internal sovereignty during 1978, due to the civil war that had been raging in the country. However, there is evidence of some government functioning—as well as activities by the Lebanese army—during the period. The Small-Singer criteria for interstate system membership (UN representation and recognition by both superpowers) are satisfied and thus Lebanon is considered an independent state throughout the period despite the civil war. Moreover, Lebanon’s protests in the UN invoked the agreement in 1978 that established the UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). We thus decided to create a new dispute for the Litani Operation, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1978. Its details are given below.

Lebanon-Israel, 1978

It is important to note that the civil war raging in Lebanon since 1974 was between a Christian-controlled government and various moslem factions. The PLO, on various occasions, provided military aid to moslem militias. The Syrian intervention in 1976 (Weinberger, 1986) came, formally, as a result of an invitation by the Lebanese government. While the Lebanese government seemingly tolerated the Syrian presence, it opposed any type of cooperation between the Israelis and the Christians in the southern part of the country. Therefore, any military activity by Israel against targets
Comments and Corrections to MID dataset

in Lebanon, even if these are considered PLO targets, is part of an MID. This is the guiding principle behind the coding of disputes.

After Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war of 1975-6, Syria stayed in Lebanon for the purpose of preventing a resumption of the civil war. Beginning in May–June 1976, Christian villages in south Lebanon, mostly near the Israeli border, came under pressure from units of the LAA commanded by Lt. Hatib and certain Palestinian units. Major Hadad of the Lebanese Army was sent with the blessing of the Christian community to organize defenses in the south. He received support from Israel and eventually, with Israeli backing and aid, organized the defense of the south. Once Israel decided to back Haddad’s militia and to protect the Christian villages, it became necessary for Israel to become directly active and Israeli incursions into south Lebanon were therefore inevitable. Late summer 1977 Israel became more concerned because of the increase in the size of PLO forces in the south (despite Syria’s attempts to control activity of the PLO). It also rejected the idea of sending Lebanese army units into the south (an idea backed by US and Syria) because it would have meant closing the good fence and end of good relations with Haddad. This left only one option: to increase military backing to the Christians. (Although the Lebanese Army was not a Syrian army, it was at the time seen as being under Syrian control). (Evron, 1987: 72).

In the second half of September, 1977 Israel provided support to a Christian offensive against the town of Khiam. Israeli armor took part in the operation and occupied positions in south Lebanon. In response, the Palestinians began rocket attacks on Israel. (Evron, 1987: 72).

Under US pressure the Israeli forces withdrew and a cease fire was declared. (Or rather, a series of tacit understandings between Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria and Haddad was reached). The cease fire collapsed, tensions between the Palestinians and the Christians in the south increased and in Nov. 1977 a process of direct escalation between Israel and the Palestinians developed. In retaliation for Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel’s north (which might have been in retaliation for Israeli artillery shelling), Israel launched a series of air strikes. November 1977 was the month of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem absorbing attention of both Israel and the Palestinians. The remainder of 1977 early 1978 was characterized by relative calm on the border. However, some developments caused concern in Israel: primarily the deployment of Saiqa units (under Syrian control) near Christian enclaves. Also, the deployment of elements of extreme Palestinian organizations in the Beaufort castle. On March 11, a group of Palestinians landed on the Israeli coast, hijacked a bus and after being stopped by Israeli security forces, killed 35 Israelis, most of them passengers. In retaliation, Israel launched the Litani Operation (objectives: to push along the 100 km border to a depth of 10km, destroy the Palestinian bases there and create a cordon sanitaire – Evron, 1987: 76; Yaniv, 1987: 72-73) on March 14, 1978. The first stage (the seizure of of a series of positions in South Lebanon termed, Even Ha’chochma) was completed by March 15. Most of the Palestinian guerrillas withdrew. Apart from the ground thrust, Israeli air and naval units attacked Palestinian bases throughout Lebanon. On March 18, 1987 the decision was taken by Begin, Weizman and Gur to expand the operation on to the Litani River (beyond the ten km. strip). The advance was completed March 19, 1978 with almost no military clashes. (Evron, 1987: 78). Most of the Palestinian guerillas had fled and these were only sporadic exchanges of fire. On March 20, 1978 Israel decided to accept Security Council
Resolution 425 and withdraw from South Lebanon. It insisted however, that UNIFIL be deployed throughout the area south of the Litani. The actual withdrawal of Israeli forces was completed on June 3, 1978 UNIFIL eventually proved relatively successful as a screen against Palestinian infiltration into Israel but substantively incapable of halting Palestinian shelling of the Christian enclave or of northern Israel. (Evron 78).

Syria-Lebanon

Beginning in 1977 Syria’s troubles in Lebanon increased with growing disappointment on part of the Christians with the Syrian role in Lebanon. Eventually clashes between the Christian militia and the Syrian army began – the first initiated by Chamoun’s militia (National Liberals) on February 7, 1978, the Fayadiyya barracks in Beirut. (Evron, 1987: 67)

Syria’s troubles increased further when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon in mid March 1978. Perceiving the Syrian lack of response as a clear sign of weakness, the Christian NLP and Al-Kata’ib militias (Phalanges) launched an offensive against Moslem and Palestinian forces in which over one hundred were killed. (Dawisha, 1980) Al Kata’ib also began to attack other Christian groups that were perceived pro-Syrian, while the NLP fighters were openly collaborating with the Israelis in the south. Naturally the Syrian could not tolerate such a blatant and dangerous challenge to their authority for long and the catalyst for the almost inevitable explosion occurred on 13, June 1978 when al-Kata’ib militia (Phalange) attacked the home of Christian pro-Syrian leader Tony Franjieh. The Syrian retaliated with heavy bombardment, including rocket fire of the Christian area of East Beirut, the Syrian demanding the complete submission of the militant Maronite forces. The Christians, supported by Israel, defiantly reiterated their demands for an immediate Syrian withdrawal. (Dawisha, 1980). In July 1978 the Christian appealed to Israel for help. Israel, seeking to delineate another ‘red line’ to Syria (defense of the Christians against a major Syrian onslaught) on July 6, 1978 sent two fighters to fly over Beirut, breaking the sound barrier. This demonstration of force was accompanied by armored concentration on the Golan Heights. (Evron, 1987: 69). However, fighting continued by both sides, so that by the end of September 1978, Syrian losses since the beginning of July were estimated to be approximately 1500 dead. (Dawisha, 1980).

In an effort to break the impasse, Lebanese President Sarkis (supported by Syria) traveled to Damascus in early Oct. with a number of compromise proposals. Under increasing international and Middle Eastern pressure and alarmed by the mounting cost of Syria’s effort to defeat the Christian militias, President Assad decided on 7 October 1978 to call a halt to the daily bombardment of Christian areas.(Dawisha, 1980) At the Bayt al-Din conference 15-17 Oct. 1978, an agreement was reached which included arrangements for a cease fire (Evron, 1987: 69).

ISRAEL-LEBANON 1977-1978 (border violations, occupation, raids)


On Sept. 20, 1977 Israeli gunboats were reported to have sailed into Lebanese territorial waters, and were later reported to have expanded their patrol area to Tripoli.
in the North and Naqoura in the South. On Sept. 20, 1977 Palestinian guerrillas directed artillery fire at Israeli boats off Tyre and PLO officials said that Israeli aircraft and tanks had taken part in the battles around Marjayoun. Military authorities in Beirut said that units of the IDF had set up brigades on Sept. 21, 1977 in the villages of Houra and Dier Mimass and on Sept. 20, 1977 had installed three artillery positions in the village of Kfar Kela about 500 yards from the border. The cease fire agreements reached on Sept. 26th was at first observed by all the factions. However, though Israeli tanks withdrew, some troops remained entrenched in the six positions which they had taken up near the border earlier in the month. By mid Oct. however, fighting had broken out again between Christian and palestinian Lebanese forces. Israel announced it would not continue talks on cease fire arrangements with Lebanese officers until Palestinian guerrillas had ceased their bombardment of Christian positions in the Sotuh. On Oct. 21, 1977 Israel declared its readiness to resume talks (Keesings 28736). However, artillery clashes between the leftist forces of the Palestinian Moslem coalition and the Israeli backed Christian Maronite militia continued intermittently.

2. Nov. 22, 1977. Israeli air strikes in Lebanon against PLO (border violation, raid?)

A serious situation arose in Sotuh Lebanon in early Nov. 1977 following the bombardment on Nov. 5, 1977 of nabatiya by Christian artillery backed by Israeli units, whose fire was reported to have come from Israeli positions inside Lebanon. The same day, the Israelis sank a Lebanese fishing vessel, claiming it had entered Israeli's territorial waters and opened fire. On Nov. 6 1977 Katyusha rockets fired from Lebanon killing two civilians in Nahariya. Israel returned fire. There were further cross border rockets attacks on Nahariya on Nov. 8, 1977, to which Israel replied with heavy air strikes and renewed artillery shelling. On Nov. 9, 1977 Israel stepped up its raids on the southern coastal region of Lebanon.


On the night of March 14, 1978 Israel launched a major invasion of South Lebanon, (following a serious terrorist attack in Israel). The first stage of the military operation (the seizure of a series of positions in South Lebanon) was completed by March 15. Most of the Palestinian guerrillas withdrew. Apart from the ground thrust, Israeli air and naval units attacked Palestinian bases throughout Lebanon. On March 18, 1987 the decision was taken by Begin, Weizman and Gur to expand the operation on to the Litani River (beyond the ten km. strip). The advance was completed March 19, 1978 with almost no military clashes. (Evron, 1987: 78; Yaniv, 1987: 62-63). Most of the Palestinian guerrillas had fled and these were only sporadic exchanges of fire. The Israeli government declared a cease fire on March 21, 1978. Partial evacuation of Israeli forces was completed by April 14, 1978.On June 8 an Israeli commando force of about 150 raided and destroyed a fatah base in Lebanon. By June 13, 1978 the Israelis had withdrawn all their troops from Lebanon.

NOTE: According to Israeli sources during the March 1978 Litani Operation 20 Israelis were reported to have been killed and 250-400 Palestinian guerrillas. Palestinian sources reported 450 Israelis and 140 guerrillas killed).

Syria was reported to have supplied arms and military aid to the PLO. However, there is no evidence of militarized confrontation—at the threat or display of force level—between Israel and Syria throughout the duration of this operation. This dispute is given #3994 in the dyadic 1.0.
This leads us to the question of the Lebanon War.

Dispute #3444 The (former) Lebanon War. This is an embarassment, because I was probably responsible for the coding of this dispute, so the entire responsibility for the miscoding is mine. However, given that over the past three years—and at present—I have done extensive research on the Israeli-Syrian interactions, here is my verdict on this conflict. First, Dispute #3444 starts, correctly on August 24, 1980, but this is the about the only thing surviving from the original coding. It involves on side A Syria and Lebanon (in contrast to only Syria in the original coding). It ends on July 25, 1981 with the Phillip Habib negotiated cease-fire between Israel and the PLO (with Syria’s participation). The peak of the MID—and also the incident characterizing the highest level of hostility within it—is the Mount Sanin incident that took place on April 28, 1981, wherein Israel shot down two Syrian troop-carrying helicopters. As a response, Syria introduced SAMs into the Beqqa Valley in Lebanon, in violation of the tacit understandings allowing its intervention in Lebanon in 1976. In terms of Israel and Lebanon, the crisis involved massive shellings by Israel on Lebanese villages and towns in response to PLO shelling of Israeli towns and villages from Lebanese soil. This crisis took place in mid-July 1981. The MID ends with this agreement, and between July 1981 and April 1982 there are no incidents.

Israeli overflights in Lebanese soil are non-codable because they were part of the 1976 tacit understanding between Syria and Israel. Although they are seeming violations of Lebanese airspace, they were not directed at Lebanon, and were not overt (no reporting of supersonic blasts were reported).

The “New” Lebanon War. The assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Paris by Palestinians provoked a series of Israeli air raids in West Beirut and in other parts of Lebanon on April 11, 1982 (Yaniv, 1987: 109). This marks the first incident in what now becomes the Lebanon War. This dispute is between Israel (initiator—side A), on the one hand, and Lebanon (first target—side B) and Syria (join target—side B). The Israeli-Lebanon war runs from April 11 1982 to June 5, 1985 (the completion of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon). 3 The Syrian-Israeli war goes from June 5 to September 1, 1982, with the Habib agreement on the evacuation of the PLO, that terminated the sustained Syrian-Israeli combat activities. After that, there are a bunch of other Syrian-Israeli disputes in Lebanon. This is now dispute #3995. Sources for these disputes include (Schiff and Yaari, 1984; Yaniv, 1987; Evron, 1987; Rabinovich, 1984; Astorino-Courtois and Maoz, 2000).

4. China-USSR 1960 Ginsburgs and Pinkele (1978) report that on orders of Chinese authorities, 100 Chinese farmers encroached on Soviet territory as an intentional probe of Soviet intent in the Buz-Aigyr region. This is also reported by Gittings (1968:159). This incident was in the old MID but not in the new.

Numerous provocations took place on the Sino-Soviet border in 1960 and 1962 however they do not consist of explicit, overt, and government directed actions so as

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3 Although Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon continues to the very day, it does not make sense to include this as one dispute wherein Israel occupies Lebanese territory. This would make the Israeli-Syrian dispute starting in 1966 to continue as long as Israel continues occupation of the Golan Height.
to meet the criteria of being included in the MID dataset. For instance, Gittings (1968:161) refers to violations committed by Chinese fishermen who crossed the border with written instructions from the People's Committee of the Heilun Ch'iang province stating that "...we propose that the catching of fish on the disputed islands [of the Amur and the Ussuri] be continued and that the Soviet border guards be told that these islands belong to China...".

For a hostile event to be included in the MID it must meet the criteria of being explicit, overt, government directed and government sanctioned. The above case does not meet these criteria. The activity was not performed by soldiers or other representatives operating upon orders of the official government.

5. **First Moroccan crisis, 1905 – not included in the data (V 2.1), but was in the old MID**

(Huth codes it as two deterrence encounters, France vs. Germany & Germany vs. Britain.

In April 1904 France and England concluded an agreement which ceded influence in Morocco to the French, in exchange for which England received a free hand in Egypt. Morocco, in response, sought ways to lessen France's hold on it. Germany, who was previously reluctant to respond to Morocco's appeals for support, and for reasons concerned with the European power rivalries (including the failure of German-Russian negotiations), suddenly switched its position in early January 1905, to become a resolute champion of Moroccan independence. Germany decided to make the Moroccan affair a test of strength of the Anglo-French entente. As the German diplomatic offensive developed during Feb. and March, 1905, the Moroccans became more steadfast in their resistance to France.

The visit of the German Emperor to Tangier on **March 31, 1905**, during which he proclaimed Germany's adherence to the principles of independence and integrity, initiated the first Moroccan Crisis and created panic in France. Between May 1st and May 5th, 1905 efforts were made by French Prime Minister Maurice Rouvier, to reach an agreement with the Germans. He was even ready to concede them a port on the coast of Morocco, but the German's insisted on a conference.

The British on their part, convey to France their apprehension as to German designs on the Moroccan coast, and proposed "full and confidential discussion...in anticipation of any complications" The French however, fearing that France was poorly prepared for war, believed that an agreement with Britain would precipitate war at a time when Russia was rendered helpless by her defeat in the Far East, and that France would bear the burden of German hostility. Rouvier took over the foreign office and renewed efforts to strike a bargain with Germany and assured of American support against unreasonable demands, accepted Germany’s proposal of a conference.

Throughout the Moroccan Crisis, although it is evident that Britain and especially France feared a breakout of war with Germany there was no explicit threat on part of Germany to that effect.

6. **Italy, Greece, UK, 1923. A 1923 dispute that was coded in the old MID data as being between Italy Greece and the UK is now (v2.1) coded as being just between Italy and Greece. In this dispute, Italy occupied Corfu (8/1923), but then withdrew. Langer**
1980 reports that Italy withdrew from Corfu under "extreme pressure" from Britain. Langer does not report a threat, but it might be worth verifying whether this was just diplomatic pressure (and so there should be no UK involvement as a MID actor) or is actually a threat (in which case the MID involving the UK should be added back into the new MID data set).

After Italy's occupation of Corfu in August 1923, its confrontation was not with Britain alone, but with the League of Nations as a body. Mussolini objected to any intervention on part of the League of Nations and maintained that as the Italo-Greek dispute arose from an incident on the Albanian border, it came under the jurisdiction of the Conference of Ambassadors and not the League of Nations. During the struggle to include or exclude the League, Britain had been content to follow France's lead. Now Britain, alerted by Mussolini's intention to stay on the island, and ever mindful of Corfu's strategic importance to a naval power, led the campaign in the Conference of ambassadors to get Mussolini out of Corfu. Awaiting Mussolini's decision on the evacuation, Britain's Lord Crewe posed an ultimatum that Britain would "resume complete liberty of action in the whole question," if Italy did not evacuate Corfu by Sept. 27. (Cassels 1970, 118). However, what the British threatened to do was not clear.

As there is no explicit threat on part of Britain to use military force against Italy, Britain is not included as a party in the MID.


8. MID: Disp. #2373 Saudi-Arabia-YAR 5.11.69-13.1.70 -9/-9 19/4
Disp. #3054 Saudi-Arabia-YAR 28.12.83-16.1.84 18/4 18/4
Disp. #1110 Saudi-Arabia-South Yemen 26.11.69-12.12.69 19/4 19/4

a) MID #2373 and 3054 are coded as between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen (YAR). It appears that at least one of these should be between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen (YPR). #3054 actually has South Yemen listed in the dispute title, but it is coded as North Yemen.

b) Re: #2373: Langer’s Encyclopedia of World History, pp. 1307-1308, discusses a 11/26/69 clash between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. A MID between Saudi Arabia and S. Yemen corresponding to that date is #1110 (running to 12/12/69). However a second dispute is listed at approximately the same time, namely #2373 from 5 Nov. through 13 January 1970; this dispute involves N. Yemen. I don’t see reference in my source materials that there are separate incidents involving N. Yemen.

a) Dispute #3054 was mistakenly coded as between Saudia Arabia and North Yemen (YAR), when it should reflect border clashes between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen (Kessings (30) 1984). This has been corrected.

b) Re: #2373 and #1110: Indeed two separate conflicts took place at approximately the same time, one between Saudi Arabia and the YAR and the other, between Saudi Arabia and the YPR.
**YAR Background:** On Nov. 5, 1967 the royalist government in North Yemen was overthrown and replaced by a three man republican council. Royalist forces continued throughout 1968 and 1969 to fight to restore royalist rule and were supported by the Saudis. However, by 1970 Saudi Arabia went through a gradual shift from full support of the most serious royalist offensive in the winter of 1967-68 to acceptance of the republic in 1970. (The acceptance however was predicated upon arrangements in the YAR that would accommodate the Saudi’s royalist clients).

**Dispute #2373:** Saudi Arabia – YAR: By August 1969, during the civil war in North Yemen, the republicans, who had overthrown the royalists in 1967, had taken their military campaign against the latter as far north as Sa‘da, very near the Saudi border. The fighting occasionally spilled over the Saudi border. North Yemeni aircraft attacked royalist positions on the Saudi side and Saudi Arabia (who still supported the royalists) hit back with its airforce.

**Dispute #1110:** Saudi Arabia – South Yemen: The radical orientation of the post June 1969 South Yemeni regime confirmed to the Saudis their earliest fears and redoubled their commitment to bring the NF down (National Front for the liberation of South Yemen). As the Saudi’s had yet to reach their accommodation with the republican government in San’a (YAR) they concentrated their efforts in the Hadramawt region, which can be reached directly from Saudi territory. Sources report an increase in fighting in the Hadramawt area in the latter third of 1969, which led in late Nov. 1969 to a direct clash of Saudi and South Yemen arms at al-Wadi’a, near where the un-demarcated borders of Saudi Arabia, YAR and South Yemen meet. Each side accused the other of starting. Riyadh responded with a series of air strikes which eventually drove the South Yemenis back. (Gause, 1990:89).

9. **Thailand –Cambodia** have a dispute that runs 2 August 1976 to 30 June 1987. Should this run so long or should it be a series of shorter incidents? Reports on the dyad suggest many military intrusions, e.g. troops from Thailand enter Cambodia, planes from Cambodia overfly Thai territory. However it also seems they are separate incidents, rather than part of one military campaign for example.

Fighting along the Thai-Cambodian border between 1976 and 1987 between the Cambodian PRK forces and the Khmer rouge (ousted in 1976), often spilled over Cambodia’s border with Thailand, which allowed Khmer rouge forces use of its territory and also attacked PRK forces. The twelve years of border incidents is considered to be one MID because at no point is there a break in the fighting for over six months.

The Thai-Cambodian frontier, closed since April 1975, was re-opened for trade at two points on **August 30, 1976.** Apart from a few minor incidents in disputed frontier areas, relations between the two countries remained friendly until after the coup of Oct. 6. Fighting broke out on **Nov. 22** however when Cambodian troops and Thai border police exchanged fire (one man killed on each side) (Keesings28511). Another exchange of fire, between the two navies occurred on **Dec. 24, 1976.** In a serious incident on **January 28, 1977** about 300 Cambodian soldiers crossed the border and committed massacres in three villages. A clash with border police followed. Border incidents continued throughout the first half of 1977 (Feb., March, May, July 20-22). (Keesings 1978, 28808-28809). Sporadic fighting continued on the Thai border during the period from July to December 1977 (Keesings 1978, 28808-28809).
(January 1978: military coup in Thailand; Feb 1978: agreement to normalize relations between Cambodian and Thai governments).

Cambodian troops (often in collaboration with Thai communist guerrillas), continued to make frequent raids into Thailand between February and Aug. 1978 (Feb. 9; Apr. 1, 9, 29; May 23; Aug. 30) (Keesings 1979, 29583).

(in 1979 and 1980 fighting continued in Kampuchea between forces of the ruling People’s Republic of Kampuchea – PRK- who were also supported by the Vietnamese, and the former Khmer Rouge government. The fighting often took place on the frontier area between Kampuchea and Thailand, who supported the Khmer Rouge).

Fighting continued in Jan., Feb., and March of 1980 near the Thai border (Khmer Rouge vs. PRK). The Thai foreign ministry on Feb 21 alleged that since Dec. 22, 1979 foreign forces had intruded into Thailand, shells had landed on Thai territory, and unidentified aircraft had violated Thai air space. The PRK foreign ministry rejected the allegations and accused the Thai government of allowing the Khmer Rouge and Khmer Serei forces to use its territory as a sanctuary. Serious fighting occurred on the Thai frontier on June 23-24, 1980, when Vietnamese and PRK troops crossed the border and were driven out by Thai troops. The PRK and Thai governments repeatedly accused each other of encroaching on their territory throughout June, July, August and Sept. of 1980. Fighting continued in the early months of 1981 between the PRK and Vietnamese one the one hand and the Khmer Rouge on the other, and on a reduced scale after the onset of the rainy season in May. After the dry season began in Oct., the PRK and Vietnamese launched their biggest offensive since 1979. Fierce fighting in the border area continued in December 1981, and January and February 1982, which led to an increase in the number of border incidents. Occasional incidents also occurred in Kampuchea and Thai territorial waters (Dec. 28, 1981 and January 2, 1982). Between the months of January and May 1982, the PRK radio complained of almost daily over flights of Kampuchean territory by Thai aircraft, and also thousands of cases of Thai artillery fire and cross border water borne incursions.

(June 1982 – formation of the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean coalition government (the CGDK, government in exile comprised mainly of Khmer Rouge)).

The heaviest fighting between the Vietnamese army and the PRK troops and the forces supporting the coalition government of the Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 occurred during the period of December 1982-April 1983, in the Thai frontier area. On April 2, 1983 a skirmish between Vietnamese troops and a Thai border patrol took place. On April 4, 1983 Thai aircraft dropped napalm on app. 150 Vietnamese soldiers who had occupied territory allegedly on the Thai side. Further clashes occurred Apr. 8 and 13, 1983. The fighting declined in intensity with the onset of the rainy season in May, although some fighting was reported in Sept., 1983. In January 1984 a significant military strike was launched at Siem Reap, on a main military center serving forces on the Thai frontier. The Vietnamese Army and PRK troops launched their first offensive of the dry season on March 25, 1984 against Khmer Rouge and Moulinaka encampments in the north eastern Thai border province of Sisaket, allegedly crossing into Thai territory
During April 1984, Vietnamese and PRK forces stepped up pressure on the CGDK bases along the 380 km stretch of the Kampuchea-Thai border and further skirmishes between Vietnamese and Thai troops were reported. On Apr. 1, 1984 five Thai troops were killed and a Vietnamese T-54 tank was destroyed on Thai territory. (Keesings 1984, 331560). On April 15 a Thai reconnaissance aircraft was shot down. On April 17 it was reported that Thai air force jets bombed suspected Vietnamese hilltop positions in the Surin province. On April 24, 1984 it was reported that a Vietnamese gunboat had sunk a Thai trawler. With the onset of the rainy season operations on the border continued sporadically. In early June a Thai boat was reportedly fired at by Vietnamese ships. SPK Kampuchean radio station said that a Thai reconnaissance aircraft, which allegedly had been directing a Thai artillery attack Kampuchean territory had been shot down on July 7, 1984 as a warning to Thailand (Keesings 33156).

Between the months of November 1984 and March 1985 the Vietnamese and PRK forces launched a heavy offensive against CGDK bases in the Thai border area. On Jan. 8, 1985, a Thai AF A-37 ground attack aircraft involved in action in a region where Vietnamese troops had intruded across the border in pursuit of Khmer guerillas, was shot down by a Vietnamese ground to air missile near the Thai province of Buriram. Thai and Vietnamese forces exchanged cross border artillery fire on a number of occasions during the Vietnamese assault on Khmer Rouge forces at Phnom Malai in February 1985. On April 22, 1985 about 800 Vietnamese troops crossed into the south eastern Thai province of Trat in pursuit of Khmer Rouge guerillas. Thai forces, supported by air strikes and artillery barrages were said to have forced most of the Vietnamese back into Kampuchea on May 8, 1985. (Keesings 33732).

June 1985 – Vietnamese and PRK forces continued to consolidate their position on the Thai-Kampuchean frontier – a process which began after the 1985-85 dry season offensive. According to the PRK, throughout July 1985, Thai military aircraft made frequent incursions into Kampuchea air space and in some instances provided support for CGDK guerillas operating in Kampuchea. On August 19, 1985 a Vietnamese unit crossed the Thai border in search for guerillas and killed at least two civilians. It was also reported that sixteen Thai border guards and civilians had been killed and eight wounded in border incidents between mid January and mid February, 1986. (Keesings 34426).

According to Thai reports on Sept. 20, 1986 one hundred Vietnamese soldiers intruded Thai territory capturing Hill 538, from where they proceeded to launch attacks on Thai soldiers. On The Thai Army recaptured the hill on Oct. 15, 1986 following a month long battle. In December 1986 and January 1987 Thailand reported that PRK and Vietnamese forces had violated Thai territory nine times. On January 2, 1987 a Thai reconnaissance plane was shot down near the border. Between January and April 1987 protracted military engagement took place between the Thai Army and Vietnamese forces over area occupied by the Vietnamese near where the borders of Thailand, Kampuchea and Laos converge.

July 1987 – diplomatic attempts between the PRK and CGDK were made to solve the Kampuchean conflict. Oct. 1987 – PRK publicized a five point political solution to the Kampuchean problem. Nov. 1987 – partial withdrawal of Thai troops from the

10. Laos-North Vietnam. The Old MID data coded a series of disputes and repeated clashes between Laos government and rebels supported by North Vietnam. In the new data, this is recorded as one long dispute from 1962 to 1973. Is this correct, or should it remain a series of smaller incidents? (6/1/62-15/2/73-9/19/4)

Civil war in Laos between the right wing government forces and the left wing Pathet Lao forces (created and aided by North Vietnam) brought about continuous military engagement between the government forces and North Vietnamese troops between 1962 and March 1973. Between the years of 1962 and 1970 estimates as to the total strength of North Vietnamese in Laos varied between 10,000 and 67,000. (Keesings 19593, 21747, 1969) The main contested area was the Plain of Jars and additional provinces in the northern and southern sectors. As in the case above, during the 12 years of conflict at no point do the hostilities cease for more than six months.

Following the 1960-1962 civil war in Laos a government of national union headed by Prince Souvana Phouma and including all three factions (right, left and neutralists) was formed. Although the right wing prince was granted a year by the General Assembly to carry out his government’s program of ‘union, concord and elimination of foreign intrusions’, the chances of reaching a political solution were short lived. Civil war fighting broke out again between right wing government forces and rebel Pathet Lao forces on April 22, 1962. On May 3, 1962 the village of Moung Sing (5 miles from the Chinese border) was occupied by the Pathet Lao and Nam Tha fell to them on May 6, 1962. In the face of the Pathet Lao offensive, the right wing forces retreated southward allowing the Pathet Lao to practically complete occupation of North West Laos. Fighting continued to the end of May, 1962. In August 1962, the Pathet Lao released 8 foreign prisoners and the right wind forces released 6 north Vietnamese whom they had captured on Aug. 22, 1962.

Fighting also broke out at the end of March 1963, on the Plain of Jars between the main body of General Kong Lae’s troops (neutralists) and a dissident left wing section, supported by the pro-communist Pathet Lao. About 250 men were killed in the clashes on the Plain of Jars during April 1963. The split spread to the neutralist group inside the government as well. Reports alleged that the North Vietnamese were sending soldiers and war equipment to the Pathet Lao (Keesings 19594). Fighting again broke out on the Plain of Jars on May 17, 1963. General Kong alleged that left wing forces assisted by North Vietnamese gun crews had shelled neutralist positions. Heavy fighting was again reported on May 31, 1963 and continued sporadically until the end of June, 1963. Renewed fighting broke out on the plain of Jars on July 17, 1963. After a lull of several weeks, fighting resumed on the Plain of Jars on September 29, 1963 and continued at intervals until Nov. 16, 1963, when a cease fire agreement was concluded. The Pathet Lao forces expelled right wing troops from their positions on Phou Khe (south of the Plain of Jars) on Feb. 26, 1964. Fighting between the two sides was also reported to have taken place during the first half of Feb, 1964 in the Thakhek area of central Laos. On April 13, 1964 the North Vietnamese government alleged that two villages in North Vietnam had been raided by right wing Laos troops. (Keesings 20355).
Integration of right wing and neutralist armed forces in **May 1964** brought on an offensive by the Pathet Lao against both on **May, 14, 1964**, at Tha Thom and in southern Laos. It was alleged that North Vietnamese troops had taken part in the offensive. Small scale fighting continued through **June, July and August 1964**. (Keesings 20356). Fighting centered largely on the Phou Kout hill and Muong Kassy (Keesings 20359). On **Sept. 15-16, 1964**, two North Vietnamese soldiers were taken prisoner and revealed that they belonged to a North Vietnamese battalion which had crossed into Laos to participate in fighting in the area of the Plain of Jars.

In **Oct. 1964** negotiations between the three political factions in Laos broke down and fighting resumed between the Royal Army and the Pathet Lao, and continued at intervals throughout the next two years. **Between Oct. 15 and 28, 1964**, the Pathet Lao lost 21 men in clashes. On **Nov. 6 and 20, 1964** government battalions launched a large scale offensive. (Keesings 21746).

Considerable fighting continued periodically between January 1965 and August 1966 between the government and Pathet Lao forces (who were renamed Oct. 2, 1965 the 'Laotian People’s Army'). (Keesings 21747). Between **Jan. 27, 1965** and **Feb. 14, 1965** fighting took place in the Sam Neue province (north-eastern Laos). On **March 8-9, 1965** Pathet Lao troops attacked an army cadet school near Savannakhet. In **Aug. 1965**, government forces opened an offensive in the Hua Mong area. (Keesings 21747). Heavy fighting also broke out in **Sept. 1965** in Moung Na and at Han, on **Nov. 15-16, 1965** at Thakhek and on **Nov. 29, 1965** the Pathet Lao launched an offensive on several fronts in southern and central Laos. A state of emergency was proclaimed on **December 2, 1965** in the provinces of Thakhek and Savannakhet. During the dates **Feb. 4-19, 1966**, fighting took place in the Muong Soui area (west of the Plain of Jars). Fighting resumed in the end of **July 1966** and continued through **August 1966** (Keesings 21747).

Sporadic fighting occurred during the greater part of 1967. In the northern provinces, the Pathet Lao maintained steady pressure from March onwards on Nam Bac (in the Luang Prabans province) which had been held by the government troops since August 1966. Pathet Lao commandos raided Luang Prabang airfield on **Feb. 2 and July 16, 1967** destroying a total of 21 aircraft. Fighting intensified in the southern provinces at the end of 1967. The post of Lao Ngam was attacked on **Dec. 12, 1967**, according to the government spokesman by three North Vietnamese regiments. The camp at Muong Plalane (about 50 miles east of Sananakhet) was captured by the Pathet Lao on **Dec. 24, 1967**, but was reoccupied by government troops on **Dec. 27, 1967**.

In **Feb. 1968** the Pathet Lao launched an offensive in the North, in the Xieng Khouang province, capturing Muong Nam on **Feb. 3, 1968**, and the posts of Tha Thom and Tha Vieng during the next three weeks. In Sam Neua province, General Vang Pao’s headquarters at Pha Thi was captured on **March 11, 1968**. Pathet Lao guerillas seized control of the Nato Hang area of Phong Saly province on **July 25, 1968**. In the South, the post of Ban Houei Sane, near the South Vietnamese border, was captured by North Vietnamese forces on **Jan. 4, 1968**. Lao Ngam was again attacked on **Feb. 22-23, 1968**. Muong Phalane was recaptured by the Pathet Lao on **Feb. 25, 1968**, but once again retaken by government troops on **May 25, 1968**. A government spokesman stated on **Feb 15** that three Pathet Lao regiments had taken two advanced posts five miles from Saravane, and on **Feb. 24, 1968** it was reported.
that both Saravane and Attopeu were encircled. Local Pathet guerilla units raided the army headquarters in Thakhek on March 11, 1968. The barracks and airport at Attopeu were bombarded on March 20-21, 1968. The intensity of the fighting declined during the rainy season (June-Oct.). Lao Ngam was reported on July 31, 1968 to have been occupied by the Pathet Lao after its garrison had withdrawn under pressure. With the return of the dry season, fighting was renewed from Oct. onwards, on the Bolovens Plateau. According to government statements, North Vietnamese forces attacked an outpost on the Bolovens Plateau during the night of Nov. 26-27, 1968 and penetrated the town on Dec. 14, 1968, but were driven out two days later.

During the first half of 1969, the Pathet Lao took the offensive in both the southern and northern provinces. In the North, the army spokesman stated on Jan. 10, 1969 that since the beginning of the year, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces had captured three posts in Xieng Khouang province and a military post and airfield in Sam Neua province. On March 1, 1969, the Pathet Lao captured Na Khang. The last government post in Hoia Khong province was reported on Apr. 28, 1969 to have been taken by the Pathet Lao. Pathet Lao forces were also active in the immediate area of Vientiane and Luang Prabang (Jan. 15-16; Feb. 3; March 11, and Apr. 23, 1969). Xieng Khouang, the largest town under their control, was evacuated by the Pathet lao forces on Apr. 29, 1969 and occupied by General Vang Pao's forces. However, the Pathet Lao regained control of the town on May 26, 1969. On May 3, 1969 it was reported that the Pathet lao had established almost complete control of sam Neua province, occupied the Beng Valley and the hills dominating the Plain of Vientiane, and captured about twenty five military posts in the northern provinces. The government also achieved an important success on June 16, 1969, by recapturing Tha Thom, which had been held by the Pathet Lao for over a year. In the South, the Pathet Lao blew up bridges, ambushed convoys and isolated towns. Tha Teng was captured on Apr. 4, 1969. Khong Sedone was attacked during the night of Apr. 16-17, 1969. Saravane and Attopeu were also encircled and their airfield repeatedly shelled. In mid 1969 the town of Muong Soui (situated west of the Plain of Jars in an area of great strategic importance) fell to the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. On June 24, 1969 a mixed North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao force launched an offensive against Muong Soui until the town was evacuated on June 28, 1969. Attempts made by government forces to recapture the town failed. On Aug. 4, 1969 government forces succeeded in intercepting Pathet Lao forces who attempted to raid Vientiane airport. However, the post of Xieng Det, which had been held by a right wing neutralist battalion, was taken by the Pathet Lao on Aug. 10, 1969. The government forces launched a successful counter offensive in the Plain of Jars at the end of Aug. 1969 and at the same time carried out another offensive in the southern provinces. By Sept. 17, 1969 they had overrun the Plain of Jars abd occupied the towns of Khang Khai, Muong Phanh, Xieng Khouang, Ban Ban, Ban Lat Sene and Phongh Savan, while Muong Soui was reoccupied on Sept. 25, 1969. In the southern provinces, government troops on Sept. 7 occupied Muong Phine, the Pathet Headquarters for the southern provinces. They were reported on Oct. 15, 1969, however, to have evacuated the town, possession of which had enabled them to threaten the Ho Chi Minh trail, under pressure from seven North Vietnamese battalions.

North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops launched an offensive on Feb. 11, 1970 to recover control of the Plain of Jars. By Feb. 26, 1970 the entire Plain of Jars fell from the hands of government forces. Little fighting took place during the first half of March 1969, however, when the North Vietnamese resumed their offensive, it was
directed against the support bases of Sam Thong and Long Chen, south-west of the Plain of Jars. However, after advancing on both targets, heavy bombing by US and Laotian aircraft compelled the North Vietnamese to withdraw on March 24, 1970 from a hill position three miles north of Long Cheng (which they had occupied the previous day), and on March 30, 1970 the government forces reoccupied Sam Thong. No major operations took place in the southern provinces during the first quarter of 1970, although sporadic fighting and rocket attacks on towns were reported. Attopeu was attacked on Apr. 28, 1970 by North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces. On June 9, 1970 the Pathet Lao captured Saravane. On June 27, 1970 Nong-Bua, the last government controlled place in Saravane province fell to the Pathet Lao. Military operations during the period from July 1970 to Jan. 1971 centered mainly on the Plain of Jars, where General Vang Pao’s forces recaptured some of the territory lost in Feb. 1970, and the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos, of which the Pathet Lao was attempting to gain control. In the North, General Vang Pao’s forces launched an offensive on the Plain of Jars in Sept. 1970 and occupied the town on Oct. 13. On Oct. 18, 1970 the forces occupied the village of Ban na as well as three other hilltop positions in the area. The North Vietnamese launched a counter-offensive attack on Nov. 21, 1970 when they bombarded the airstrip at Muong Soul and overran three outposts near Pak Ou. Pathet Lao forces were reported to have captured two posts near the Plain of Jars and five others around Muongmonk, in Xieng Khouang province. In an attempt to cut the Pathet Lao supply lines and to reduce pressure on the Long Chen base, General Pao’s began an operation in December 1970 against Ban Ban, which lasted through January 1971. In the South, the government proclaimed a state of emergency on July 23, 1970, in six southern provinces. Government troops opened an offensive on Aug. 31 in the Attopeu area, which was reported on Sept. 26, 1970 to have been repulsed by the Pathet Lao. On Nov. 23, 1970 North Vietnamese troops were reported to have captured Royal Mountain and three other outposts on the south-eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. In Dec. 1970 government troops were reported to have captured large quantities of arms and ammunition in a two weeks’ sweep north-east of the town Pak Song.

According to reports of the Laotian Defense Ministry, about 150 North Vietnamese were killed on Jan. 8, 1971 in an unsuccessful attack made by their soldiers on the outpost of Ban Houei. In Feb. and March 1971, the pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces took the offensive in the northern provinces and in May 1971 launched a major operation in South Laos. Government troops launched counter offensives from July 1971 to Sept. 1971 in the North (recovering the Plain of Jars) and South. (Keesings 24959). Two additional major offensives in the North and South were launched by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Dec. 1971. The offensives ran through Jan., Feb. and March 1972 and were met with very little government opposition.

Peace negotiations began on Oct. 17, 1972 but made little progress. Meanwhile, fighting continued on all fronts as both sides attempted to secure an advantageous negotiation position. Between Oct. 26, 1972 and Nov. 18, 1972 the Pathet laoi obtained control of the Plain of Jars and in the South, government forces launched two offensives. An agreement was initialled on Feb. 20, 1973, providing for a standstill cease fire on Feb. 22, 1973. But fighting continued through the first week of March 1973. Reports suggested at that time that cease fire was becoming increasingly effective. (Keesings 25843).
Stuart Bremer's comments

1. Syria-Israel is listed as a dyad in Disp. #3422 but Syria is not a member of the system at this time because of its union with Egypt. Hence, according to the rules only the Israel-Egypt dyad is valid.

2. The data set had #375 BAV-SWD dispute commencing in 1848, instead of 1849.

   These two have been corrected.

3. Disp. #1039 shows a SYR-ISR dyad but non SYR-IRQ dyad. According to the incidents records Israel showed troops against both Syria and Iraq on 21 Sept. 1970, so its appears the latter should be present.

   See comments on Dispu #1039 above.

4. Disp. #258 – I think there is a problem with FRN-JPN. You have three records for this dyad, but I think there should be one. FRN (defeated and vichy) was out of the system before JPN attacked the USA, so the only overlap with JPN is liberated FRN (23 Oct. 1944).

   The dispute has been changed to reflect 2 disputes:

   1939-1940 dispute but no war.

   1944-1945 Liberated FRN in war with JPN.

Persian Gulf Warfare, 1984-1988

The Iran-Iraq war involved a number of MIDs that are related to navigation in and around the Persian Gulf. Both Iran and Iraq acted to limit the ability of the opponent to receive supply via the sea, and—more importantly—to limit the oil export of the opponent. In many of these cases, we have MIDs pitting Iran against a number of states that are seemingly unrelated to the region. We also have multiple cases of disputes between Iraq and seemingly unrelated states. In the MID 2.1 version, Iraq was involved in nine dispute in 1984, ten disputes in 1985, six in 1986, eleven disputes in 1987, and seven in 1988. Likewise, Iran was involved in seven MIDs in 1984, in eleven MIDs in 1985, nine MIDs in 1986, no less than 25 MIDs in 1987, and in eight MIDs in 1988.

A closer inspection of these MIDs reveals that there is a real problem with many of these disputes. In particular, it is not evident that they were (a) separate disputes, and (b) these cases meet the definitional criteria, in particular, the criterion of a government-directed military action. Here is the story, as we see it in those cases.

a. Iran-third parties. There are three classes of third parties that were involved in some way in the Iran-Iraq war: (a) Pro-Iraqi Persian Gulf states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE), (b) the US, UK, and France, actors committed to insure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and (c) countries, the flags of which various civilian vessels were carrying. I address each category separately.
In the first category, it is clear that any military action initiated by Iran towards those states, or their vessels is a clear MID. “For some time, the addressees of the Iranian strategy in the Gulf were... Kuwait and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia. These countries had contributed up to $50bn. to the Iraqi war effort and sold oil from the neutral zone on behalf of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq had extensive use of Kuwaiti port facilities, especially for its military procurements... Hence the ongoing Iranian counterendeavor to dissociate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from Iraq, necessarily by force. The Iranians targeted their attacks on ships trading with Kuwait... arguing that 'if our ships are hit, the ships of Iraq's partners will be hit’” (MECS, 1990, pp. 185-186). The same Iranian policy applied to the other Gulf states. Thus any set of military incidents directly involving Iran and one of the Gulf states qualifies as a dyadic MID.

b. Iran-US, UK, France, Soviet Union. Following Iranian attacks of Kuwaiti vessels and other ships coming and going from Kuwait, Kuwait approached both the Soviet Union and the US, “seeking the protection of their flags, i.e., to reflag the majority of Kuwaiti... oil tankers. ... [I]n January 1987 a Kuwaiti delegation went to Moscow where it was agreed to reflag 11 tankers. ... [W]hen the Soviet response became known, Washington’s decision to reflag 11 Kuwaiti tankers and provide them with American naval protection, was communicated to Kuwait in early March... [I]ncreasing mining incidents at the beginning of August [1987] caused first Britain and France, and then Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands to dispatch to the Gulf up to 34 combat vessels. During all this time the Soviet Navy kept a low profile in the Gulf; its routine presence there consisted of four or five warships. No attacks on Soviet ships occurred after May (MECS, 1990, 186).” This suggests also that the Iran-vs.-major powers clashes are MIDs as coded.

c. Iran-other states. These other states were “involved” by virtue of attacks by Iranian vessels (or by Iranian mining of the Gulf access routes) on tankers and other ships carrying the flags of Japan, Republic of Korea, and some 20 or so other states. Here, if we were to disaggregate each case into a dyadic dispute we would get a huge number of disputes. The problem with virtually all of these cases, is that they fail to meet the government-directed action criterion. The Iranians did not direct their act to the governments the flags of which were raised on those ships. Nor is there evidence that these ships had been dispatched by the governments of the companies that owned the ships. In all likelihood, all of these ships were privately owned vessels, and the shooting or blowing up such ships by mines was directed at Iraq and Kuwait. Also, there is no evidence that the governments to which these ships belonged responded at a codable level. Thus the solution is simply to delete these dyads from the dataset.

d. Iraq-other states. Iraqi pattern of disputes during the years 1985-1988 is similar. In response to, or independently of, Irani efforts to deny Iraq of free shipping Iraq launched both missile and naval attacks at ships going to and from Irani ports. Again, there is no evidence that these have been government-directed action, nor is there evidence that the governments in question complained. Thus, these disputes are also omitted.
Bibliography

1. Dispute #25


2. Disputes #1039 & #3241


3. Disputes #3994, 3444, 3995


Source for Disputes #258, #627, #3990-3993, and others related to WWII.


**General Sources (for various disputes mentioned here)**


*Keesings Contemporary Archive*. London: Longman’s, various years.


*Iran-Iraq War and Persian Gulf Disputes, 1984-1988*


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Comments on Version 1.1 of the Dyadic MID Dataset

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Version 1.1 of the dyadic MID dataset replaces Version 1.0 published in August 1999. The present version improves on the previous one in two important respects.

1. The current version reflects the comments of many people who have been using the previous version and encountered problems, errors, or puzzles of some sort. I would like to thank all those who took the time and effort to communicate those problems.

2. A specific problem of “unnatural” cumulation of MIDs in the 1984-88 period in the Persian Gulf has been fixed. This represents a fundamental change from the COW MID 2.1 Dataset. The problem generated by this “unnatural clustering” of MIDs and the solution provided in Version 1.1 is given in the MID Comments File.

3. As with the previous version of the dyadic MID dataset, we encourage you to use the data on two conditions. (1) proper acknowledgment, and (2) please give us your comments, questions, suggestions, and criticisms.

Those include D. Scott Bennett, Stuart Bremer, Andrew Enterline, Erik Gartzke, Paul Hensel, Jim Ray, Paul Senes, and Richard Tucker.